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 Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public 
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10 Abstract 
11 
12 
13 
14 English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory 
15 regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by 
17 performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a 
18 
19 number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on 
20 assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper we investigate the variation in 
22 financial  reporting  quality,  proxied  by  discretionary  accruals,  with  the     incentives 
23 
24 introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to 
25 report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory 
27 intervention  in  both  the  short  and  medium  term,  discretionary  accruals  are    more 
28 
29 positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds 
30 and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from 
32 financial  breakeven  as the  primary performance  objective,  there  remains an aversion 
33 
34 to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is 
35 driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of 
37 retained  earnings)   and  the   prudential   borrowing  limit   (a   measure   of  borrowing 
38 
39 capacity). 
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1 
2 
3 Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public 
4 healthcare organisations 
6 
7 
8 1 Introduction 
9 
10 Over the past thirty years an ongoing programme of public sector reform 
11 throughout the OECD has resulted in the increased marketization of public services, 
13 the corporatisation of public sector entities, and the emulation of private sector ‘best 
14 
15 practice’ including increased managerial freedom (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Such 
16 reforms  are widely referred to as New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991, 
18 1995) and have been particularly pronounced in the area of healthcare, where public 
19 
20 spending accounts for more than 7% of GDP for most of Europe, the British 
21 Commonwealth and the US
1 
(House of Commons 2011, p.4). To protect both public 
23 money and services there has been a corresponding growth in risk-based regulation in 
24 
25 which the extent of scrutiny and intervention into public service providers has been 
26 determined by their performance against a number of pre-determined performance 
28 metrics and in which an assessment of financial sustainability plays a key role (Black 
29 
30 and Baldwin 2010). In this context, variations in financial reporting quality could 
31 undermine both regulatory effectiveness and resource allocation across and between 
33 public  services.  In  this  paper,  we  investigate  the  variation  of  financial     reporting 
34 
35 quality with regulatory incentives when public entities are granted considerable 
36 managerial freedom and are subject to a risk based regulatory regime. 
38 
39 Whilst  agency  theory  predicts  the  management  of  financial  performance  to 
40 
41 avoid regulatory intervention and to trigger rewards for good performance, theories of 
42 public service motivation offer an alternative framework in which we might not 
43 
44 expect  significant management  of  reported  performance.   First, the primary objective 
45 
46 of public sector organisations is service delivery rather than the generation of profit 
47 (International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board® (IPSASB®) 2014, p.4). 
48 
49 Second,  the  incentive  framework  in  the  public  sector  is  weak:  the  incidence      of 
50 
51 performance related pay is low and has a focus on service delivery rather than 
52 financial performance (The Work Foundation 2014). Third, information asymmetry 
53 
54 between   organisational   managers   and   those   monitoring   and   evaluating       their 
55 
56 
57 
1 Total spending on healthcare in the US is more than twice that of other nations but approximately half 
58 is represented by public (federal) spending mainly on the Medicare and Medicaid programmes. 
59 
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1 
2 
3 performance  is often low: regulators and funding providers often have  the power    and 
4 
5 resources to demand additional information which reduces the potential for disguising 
6 underlying performance. These factors arguably combine to create a culture which is 
7 
8 inimical  to  the  misleading  of  key  stakeholders,  such  as  regulators  and  the  public, 
9 
10 about the underlying financial performance of the entity. However, NPM-inspired 
11 reforms have undoubtedly strengthened the incentive framework and in this context 
12 
13 there has been some concern, and evidence, that such reforms erode and ‘crowd out’ 
14 
15 public service motivation and values (Georgellis et al. 2011, Jørgensen and Anderson 
16 2011, Bellé 2015). Further, with the widespread adoption of accruals accounting 
17 
18 throughout the OECD public sector (Blöndal 2003), the incentives and opportunities 
19 
20 for the management of reported financial performance have been   increasing. 
21 
22 In  not  for  profit  entities,  for  example,  Jegers  (2010)  has  analysed  the 
23 
24 manipulation of earnings and other financial indicators and shows that agency 
25 problems exacerbate earnings management with a potentially negative impact on 
27 welfare, an issue also raised in a study of performance measurement practices in the 
28 
29 public sector by Cuganesan et al. (2014). They identify the tensions between the 
30 performance of individual accounting entities and broader system objectives with, for 
32 example, ‘..an emphasis on local goal achievement at the expense of broader global 
33 
34 objectives, and a focus on measured performance dimensions to the detriment of 
35 unmeasured ones such as system responsibility and important inter-organisational 
37 collaboration’  (p.281).  Both  Jegers  (2010)  and  Cuganesan  et  al.  (2014)  call      for 
38 
39 additional research into performance measurement in the public sector with a view to 
40 exploring the risks associated with current practice. This paper represents a response 
42 to these calls. 
43 
44 
45 Our setting is English National Health Service Foundation Trusts. Foundation 
46 Trusts account for more than £30bn, roughly 30%, of UK annual public expenditure 
47 
48 on   healthcare.   They  were  established   from   2004-05  and  have   been  granted   an 
49 
50 unprecedented level of managerial freedom (Lapsley and Schofield 2009) including 
51 the ability to retain surpluses and to borrow commercially in order to fund their 
52 
53 strategic   development,   over   which   they   exercise   a   high   degree   of  autonomy. 
54 
55 Foundation Trusts are subject to regulation by an independent regulator, Monitor, 
56 (Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003) which 
57 
58 
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1 
2 
3 operates  a  risk-based  regulatory  regime
2    
(Monitor  2009b  p.5).  Poor    performance 
4 
5 against a number of financial metrics results in intervention in the form of additional 
6 monitoring and possible replacement of the Board and Governing Body (Health and 
7 
8 Social  Care  (Community  Health  and  Standards)  Act  2003,  s.23,  National     Health 
9 
10 Service Act 2006, s.52) whilst good performance results in a reduction in the intensity 
11 of monitoring, and greater managerial autonomy (Monitor 2009b p.5). Regulatory 
12 
13 action  is triggered  by performance  against two  key  metrics: a  ‘financial risk-rating’
3
, 
14 
15 which aims to measure financial sustainability, (Monitor 2009b, pp. 4-5) and which is 
16 an aggregate measure of performance (comprising EBITDA margin, surplus margin, 
17 
18 return on assets,  liquidity and performance  against  plan)  and a  ‘prudential borrowing 
19 
20 limit’ which is a measure of gearing and borrowing capacity. This regime thus 
21 introduces incentives for the avoidance of regulatory intervention and for the 
22 
23 triggering of additional managerial  autonomy. 
24 
25 
Prior  literature  has  explored  accruals  management  in  public  sector   entities 
27 only   in   response   to   the   financial  breakeven  benchmark  and   has   found income 
28 
29 increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals when pre-managed performance is 
30 below (above) this benchmark and that public entities also manage discretionary 
32 accruals to avoid the reporting of small losses (Leone and Van Horn 2005, Ballantine 
33 
34 et al. 2007). We contribute to this literature and to our understanding of financial 
35 reporting quality in the public sector by investigating the impact of a new form of 
37 public  sector  regulation.  We  use  discretionary  accruals  as  our  proxy  for   financial 
38 
39 reporting quality and, using data sourced from financial statements and the regulator’s 
40 reporting template, estimate a pre-managed risk rating and prudential borrowing limit. 
42 We find that: first, discretionary accruals are income increasing (decreasing) for pre- 
43 
44 managed  deficits  (surpluses)  indicating  that  financial  performance  is  managed     to 
45 
46 
 
47 2 A risk based regulatory regime is one in which the level of monitoring and of regulatory intervention 
48 is proportionate to the assessed risk to services and/or financial sustainability. Such regimes are 
49 being increasingly adopted as public money is devolved to service providers with increased levels of 
50 managerial freedom, and in order to generate efficiency in regulatory costs by targeting regulatory 
51 attention where it is most needed. For a summary of the key features of a risk based regulatory 
52 regime, see Black and Baldwin 2010, pp. 183-185. The Foundation Trust regulatory regime exhibits 
53 these key features. 
54 3 ‘Financial risk rating’ is the regulator’s terminology and includes metrics which are related  to 
55 operational performance (such as EBITDA and % of plan EBITDA achieved) as well as metrics 
56 related for example to liquidity. The term is used to distinguish it from service based non-financial 
57 metrics such as waiting times for treatment. 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3 report   small   surpluses;   second,   consistent   with   incentives   to   avoid   regulatory 
4 
5 intervention, discretionary accruals are significantly more positive when the pre- 
6 managed risk rating is just below the intervention triggering threshold and when the 
7 
8 prudential  borrowing  limit  is  breached;  third,  consistent  with  incentives  to  protect 
9 
10 future performance against cost and revenue pressures, and the possibility of future 
11 regulatory intervention, that they are significantly more negative when well above the 
12 
13 risk  rating intervention threshold;   fourth,  that,  despite  a  move  away from  financial 
14 
15 breakeven as a key objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. When 
16 the financial risk rating is disaggregated we further find that the management of 
17 
18 discretionary accruals is being driven by the  income and  expenditure surplus/deficit    - 
19 
20 a measure of retained earnings and a key performance metric for all stakeholders - and 
21 by the prudential borrowing limit, a breach of which would have implications for the 
22 
23 strategic capacity of the Trust. 
24 
25 
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 considers prior literature; section 3 
27 gives  further  contextual  information  regarding  the  institutional  setting  and includes 
28 
29 our hypothesis development; section 4 sets out our method, data and sampling; 
30 section 5 reports our findings and section 6 concludes with a discussion and 
32 consideration of the implications of our  findings. 
33 
34 
35 2 Prior literature 
36 Prior empirical studies in the not-for-profit and public sectors have focused on 
37 
38 reported surpluses. These studies show that, in response to the need to protect existing 
39 
40 and future levels of funding and for the signalling of competence in the use of 
41 resources, entities manage earnings to report small surpluses close to zero, thereby 
42 
43 demonstrating  an  aversion  not  only  to  the  reporting  of  losses  (consistent  with  the 
44 
45 findings of the much more substantive private sector literature), but also to the 
46 reporting of large surpluses. Evidence of such management has been found in both 
47 
48 public  and  not-for-profit   hospitals   (Hoerger  1991,   Leone   and  Van  Horn    2005, 
49 
50 Ballantine et al. 2007) and in the not-for-profit sector more generally (Verbruggen 
51 and Christiaens 2012). 
52 
53 
54 Ballantine et al. (2008) in the UK and Eldenburg et al. (2004) in the US also 
55 
56 provide evidence of incentives to avoid the reporting of losses by finding that board 
57 turnover is higher when losses are reported. Consistent with a profit objective, such 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3 turnover was found to be higher in for-profit hospitals than not-for-profit hospitals 
4 
5 (Eldenburg et al. 2004). Hoerger (1991) similarly finds that the variability of 
6 profitability is greater in for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. In the US not-for- 
7 
8 profit sector, the manipulation of accounting numbers has also been found in the form 
9 
10 of cost-shifting in response to managerial compensation incentives (Krishnan et al. 
11 2006, Jones and Roberts 2006) and in order to reduce reported administrative and 
12 
13 fund-raising expenditure for the purposes of enhancing the perceived efficiency of the 
14 
15 entity by donors (Krishnan and Yetman  2011). 
16 
17 Prior research in the private sector indicates that the regulatory setting, and the 
18 
19 possibility of increased regulatory scrutiny in particular, creates incentives for the 
20 management of reported financial performance (Jones 1991, Mensah et al. 1994, 
22 Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Kasznik 1999, Navissi 1999). There are currently no 
23 
24 equivalent studies in the public sector environment. Public sector entities have 
25 conventionally been subject to a direct performance management regime, associated 
27 with a command and control culture, rather than the independent regulation which is 
28 
29 associated with higher levels of managerial freedom. The institutional setting of 
30 Foundation Trusts, which is characterised by strong regulatory oversight offers an 
32 opportunity to address this  gap. 
33 
34 
35 A number of studies investigating accruals management in the public and not- 
36 for-profit sectors adopt the model developed by Leone and Van Horn (2005). They 
37 
38 find   a    negative   association   between   discretionary   accruals   and     pre-managed 
39 
40 performance and that discretionary accruals are managed to reduce both surpluses and 
41 deficits by about 44%. Elsewhere, in Portuguese municipalities and in the wider not- 
42 
43 for-profit  sector,  the  reduction is found  to be  between  40% and  80% (Ferreira  et al. 
44 
45 2012, Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012). However in a study of UK universities, 
46 Greenwood and Tao (2016) find that financial reporting quality improves with the 
47 
48 extent of regulatory monitoring, as proxied by the proportion of public funds sourced 
49 
50 from the sector regulator. This effect has also been observed in the US healthcare 
51 sector where Krishnan and Yetman (2011), in a study of not-for-profit hospitals, find 
52 
53 that cost-shifting aimed  at enhancing efficiency ratios is reduced  with the     proportion 
54 
55 of funding sourced from the Medicare and Medicaid programmes. We contribute to 
56 this literature by investigating the extent of accruals management in a healthcare 
57 
58 setting which is funded, almost entirely, by regulated public   funding. 
59 
60   
  
1 
2 
3 In  the  UK,  Ballantine et al.  (2007)  have  investigated accruals management in 
4 
5 the public sector setting of English National Health Service (NHS) Trusts, the 
6 predecessors of NHS Foundation Trusts. NHS Trusts were subject to direct 
7 
8 performance  management  by  the  Department  of  Health  and  the  primary   financial 
9 
10 objective was a statutorily enshrined annual performance target of financial breakeven 
11 (National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990). In this institutional setting 
12 
13 the use of discretionary accruals to report small surpluses just above zero was found 
14 
15 to be particularly marked. However, with the establishment, from 2004-05, of 
16 Foundation Trusts, the emphasis moved away from a primary focus on financial 
17 
18 breakeven  to  performance  evaluation  based  on  multiple  financial  metrics  and    the 
19 
20 generation of surpluses to fund service development. We contribute to the literature 
21 by investigating the impact of this new regulatory regime on financial reporting 
22 
23 quality. 
24 
25 
26 3 Regulatory setting and hypothesis development 
27 NHS Foundation Trusts were established from 2004-05 as the preferred model 
28 
29 of healthcare service delivery in England (Health and Social Care (Community Health 
30 
31 and Standards) Act 2003). As at the end of 2013-14 there were 147 Foundation Trusts 
32 in total, represented by 101 trusts delivering acute hospital services and 46 delivering 
33 
34 mental health or ambulance services. They receive most of their capital, in the form of 
35 
36 ‘taxpayers’ equity’, and revenues, in the form of contracted payments for patient 
37 treatments, from other public bodies but are free from central government control. 
38 
39 Instead,  they  report  directly  to  Parliament  and  are  subject  to  regulation   by       an 
40 
41 independent regulator, Monitor. A distinctive feature of the setting is that, unlike 
42 their predecessor organisations (NHS Trusts) and other public sector entities, they are 
43 
44 expected to generate surpluses for reinvestment into the strategic development of    their 
45 
46 services, over which they exercise a large degree of autonomy. A further radical 
47 innovation in the context of Foundation Trusts is their ability to borrow money from 
48 
49 commercial markets to further fund their  development. 
50 
51 
Monitor adopts a  risk  based  approach to  regulation: the level of  scrutiny  and 
52 
53 of intervention is determined by a financial risk rating and a prudential borrowing 
54 
55 limit. The aim is to protect continuity of service by acting as measures of financial 
56 viability (Monitor 2013). 
57 
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1 
2 
3 The financial risk rating is determined by performance against 5 component 
4 
5 metrics. Figure 1 shows that these are categorised as being related to financial 
6 efficiency (measured by the I&E surplus margin and return on assets - total weighting 
7 
8 40%); underlying performance, (measured by the EBITDA margin % - weighting 25 
9 
10 %); liquidity (weighting 25%) and achievement of plan (measured by EBITDA as a % 
11 of plan – weighting 10%). 
12 
13 
 
 
14 
15 Insert Figure 1 about here 
16 
17 
18 
19 A component risk rating of between 1 (poor) and 5 (good) is first determined 
20 
21 by the threshold levels of performance as shown in Figure 1. Appropriate weightings 
22 
23 are then applied to these component risk ratings to arrive at a final overall risk rating 
24 of between 1 and 5. Risk ratings below 3 result in additional monitoring and other 
25 
26 forms of intervention whilst a risk rating of 5 can result in less frequent monitoring, 
27 
28 and the potential for greater managerial autonomy (Monitor, 2009b, pp. 5 and 7). An 
29 example illustrating how the final rating is calculated is included in Figure 1. This 
30 
31 shows that a Trust with an I&E surplus margin of 0.8% (component rating 2), an 
32 
33 ROA of 3.5% (component rating 3), EBITDA margin of 6.2% (component rating 3), 
34 liquidity of 28 days (component rating 4) and a plan performance of 83% (component 
35 
36 rating 3),  achieves an overall financial risk  rating of  3.  This Trust’s  performance     is 
37 
38 therefore above the threshold for intervention even though the I&E surplus 
39 component falls below a 3 rating. 
40 
41 
42 The risk rating system also has features which discourage year-end accruals 
43 management: it is multi-dimensional such that the impact of manipulation is rendered 
45 less  readily  computable;  the  flattery  of  current  year  financial  performance  at    the 
46 
47 expense of future reported performance is mitigated by the capping of ratings for 
48 Trusts forecasting losses (Monitor 2009b, p.15); and finally, over-optimism in 
50 forecasting  is  discouraged  through  the  %  of  plan  metric  (see  Figure  1). However, 
51 
52 notwithstanding these features, the framework creates incentives to manage 
53 performance in order to first, avoid intervention in the event of poor performance and 
55 second, to trigger rewards for better performance. This latter incentive is, however, 
56 
57 tempered  by  incentives  to  manage   performance   downwards   in   order  to     signal 
58 
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1 
2 
3 efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources; to avoid the adverse publicity 
4 
5 associated with the reporting of high surpluses; and, in a period of pressures on public 
6 spending and year-on-year requirements to deliver efficiency savings, a desire to 
7 
8 provide  a  contingency  against  future  cost  and  revenue  pressures.  In  this     context 
9 
10 accruals management has been a matter of concern to the regulator because when the 
11 health service is under financial pressure there is a heightened imperative to 
12 
13 demonstrate  efficiency  and  effectiveness  in  the  use  of  public  funds,  not  only     in 
14 
15 individual trusts but across the whole healthcare  system. 
16 
17 The  second  key  metric  which  can  determine  regulatory  intervention  is   the 
18 
19 ‘Prudential Borrowing Limit’. The ability to borrow funds from commercial sources 
20 is an NPM-inspired innovation which has the objective of delivering greater 
22 flexibility and  managerial autonomy to  Foundation  Trusts  in  order  to  develop   their 
23 
24 services. However, to protect services from risky borrowing, this facility is regulated 
25 by the Prudential Borrowing Code (Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
27 Standards) Act 2003, s.12, Monitor 2009a). Based on experience in the US where not- 
28 
29 for-profit hospitals with credit ratings equivalent to the minimum investment grade of 
30 BBB (Standard and Poor’s, Fitch) have access to a wider range of affordable funding, 
32 the Prudential Borrowing Code requires that Foundation Trusts maintain a level of 
33 
34 liquidity which is consistent with a BBB credit rating. This is determined by reference 
35 to four key ratios, based on annual plan projections, for which minimum levels of 
37 performance are required. The ratios are dividend
4  
cover, interest cover, debt service 
38 
39 cover and debt service as a % of revenue. The minimum levels of performance can be 
40 seen in Figure 2. Breach of any one of these thresholds, either on actual or revised 
42 forecast   performance,   has   the   potential  to  trigger   regulatory  intervention  and   a 
43 
44 reduction in borrowing capacity, thereby creating an incentive to manage performance 
45 to avoid breach of the prudential borrowing limit. 
47 
48 
49 Insert Figure 2 about here 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 4 The taxpayers’ equity which funds Foundation Trusts is provided subject to the requirement to pay  an 
58 annual ‘public’ dividend currently set at 3.5%. 
59 
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1 
2 
3 3.1 Hypothesis development 
4 
5 Public motivation theory and the presence of a strong monitoring framework 
6 which incorporates features which discourage the management of accruals lead to our 
7 
8 null hypothesis: 
9 
10 
Hypothesis:   There   is   no   variation   in   discretionary   accruals   with pre- 
11 
12 managed  financial performance. 
13 
14 
15 However, the regulatory environment of Foundation Trusts introduces 
16 incentives for the management of accruals and we therefore supplement this null 
17 
18 hypothesis with alternative  hypotheses. 
19 
20 
Prior  research  in  the  public  and  not-for-profit  sectors  has  found  a negative 
21 
22 association  between  discretionary  accruals  and  pre-managed  surpluses  (Leone   and 
23 
24 Van Horn 2005, Ferreira et al. 2012, Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012) in response to 
25 incentives to signal efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources, avoidance of 
26 
27 the  adverse  consequences  of  reporting  a  deficit  and  weak  incentives  for  reporting 
28 
29 large surpluses. Ballantine et al. (2007) also find accruals management in response to 
30 incentives to provide contingencies against future reductions in income and/or rises in 
31 
32 costs.  Similar incentives for  managing accruals  to  report  small surpluses exist in   the 
33 
34 Foundation Trust regime and we therefore expect discretionary accruals to be 
35 performance increasing in the presence of a pre-discretionary deficit and performance 
36 
37 decreasing in the presence of a pre-discretionary  surplus. 
38 
39 
40 H1: There will be a negative association between discretionary accruals and 
41 the pre-managed surplus. 
42 
43 
44 However, the Foundation Trust regulatory regime introduces other incentives 
45 for managing accruals so we test the general alternative hypothesis: 
46 
47 
48 H2: Discretionary accruals are additionally managed in response to specific 
49 incentives introduced by the regulatory regime. 
51 
52 The strongest incentive is that of intervention  avoidance: 
53 
54 
H2a:  Discretionary   accruals   are   additionally  performance   increasing to 
55 
56 avoid intervention, i.e. when the pre-managed risk rating is 2 or when the 
57 
58 pre-managed prudential borrowing limit is  breached. 
59 
60   
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1 
2 
3 For  each  of  the  other  pre-managed  risk  ratings,  the  incentives  for  accruals 
4 
5 management over and above that captured by H1 are less clear. At levels of 
6 performance which are well above the threshold for intervention (pre-managed risk 
7 
8 ratings  of 4  or 5) the  incentives to  reduce  reported  performance are  captured  by the 
9 
10 pre-managed surplus in H1. It is, however, questionable whether the incentives to 
11 create contingencies against future cost and revenue pressures, would result in 
12 
13 accruals  management  greater  than  this  as  such  incentives  are  not  specific  to    the 
14 
15 Foundation Trust setting. For those Trusts with a pre-managed risk rating of 3, 
16 rewards in the form of lower monitoring levels provide an incentive to manage 
17 
18 performance  upwards but  this  is  moderated by the  incentives  to sustain performance 
19 
20 over the medium term and to avoid future intervention. A Trust is unlikely to manage 
21 performance upwards this year if that puts at risk the ability to achieve a 3 rating in 
22 
23 future years. On the other hand, at low levels of performance (pre-managed risk rating 
24 
25 of 1) there may be issues of managerial competence with little scope of avoiding 
26 intervention. There may also be, for some Trusts, the possibility of ‘big bath’ 
27 
28 accounting in order to flatter future reported performance and risk   ratings. 
29 
30 
Thus, in all the above circumstances, the alternative hypothesis is ambivalent 
32 about the level of additional accruals  management: 
33 
34 
35 H2b: For a pre-managed risk rating of 1, 3, 4 or 5 the level of accruals 
36 management is consistent with H1, i.e. no additional management. 
37 
38 
39 Finally, despite the move away from financial breakeven as the primary 
40 performance benchmark, loss aversion remains as a feature of the regulatory regime 
41 
42 and both private sector and public sector literature finds that small loss avoidance is a 
43 
44 strong motivator for accruals  management. 
45 
46 H2c:  Discretionary   accruals  will   be   more   positive  for   small pre- 
47 
48 managed deficits. 
49 
50 
To  test  these  hypotheses  we  estimate  discretionary  accruals  and investigate 
51 
52 whether  there  is  any  variation  with  the  pre-managed  risk-rating  and  with  the 
53 
54 prudential borrowing limit. 
55 
56 
57 
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1 
2 
3 4 Research design 
4 
5 
4.1 Sample and data 
7 Our  sample  includes  all  Foundation  Trusts  over  the  five  year  period  from 
8 
9 2009-10 to 2013-14. The number of Trusts increases from 129 in 2009-10 to 147 in 
10 2013-14 giving a total of 700 Trust-year observations. However, as a result of the 
11 
12 deduction of part-year observations for Trusts which come into existence part way 
13 
14 through the financial year, the absence of lagged observations for new Trusts, and the 
15 requirement for leading and lagging data in the modelling of discretionary accruals 
17 our  sample  reduces to  518  observations representing the  four  years from 2009-10  to 
18 
19 2012-13. The final sample for our multivariate analysis is further reduced to 332 
20 observations as a consequence of the requirement for lagged data and 41 missing data 
22 for Trusts working capital  facility.
5
 
23 
24 
25 Financial statement data for the years 2009-10 and 2010-11, and lagged 
26 variables for 2008-09, were obtained from the Laing and Buisson database of NHS 
27 
28 financial statements. Data for 2011-12 to 2013-14 data was accessed direct from the 
29 
30 Monitor consolidation schedules as was data for the working capital facility 
31 throughout the period of our study.
6 
Plan data was not available and is therefore 
32 
33 omitted from our analysis. 
34 
35 
4.2 Accruals modelling 
36 
37 In   this   paper,   we   adopt   an   aggregate   accruals   method.   Although  both 
38 
39 aggregate accruals and the specific accrual of depreciation have been investigated in 
40 prior literature, no management of depreciation has been found (Stalebrink 2007, 
41 
42 Pilcher and  Van der Zahn 2010) and, in  the Foundation Trust context both  bad    debts 
43 
44 and inventory, which have been investigated elsewhere (Marquardt and Wiedman 
45 2004), are low. In contrast there is flexibility in payables. Accrued expenses, for 
46 
47 example,  comprise  many  small  items  and  have  been  rising  over  the  period  of our 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 5 This data is required for a calculation of the liquidity metric – see Figure 1. 
53 6 Monitor consolidation schedules were accessed via: 
54 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/foundation-trust-consolidation-ftc-accounts-data. The 
55 publication of these schedules represents a recent innovation by Monitor in response to this study. 
56 Monitor has confirmed that the data in the 2009-10 and 2010-11 data in the Laing and Buisson 
57 database has been taken from their consolidation schedules and the two sources are therefore 
58 identical. 
59 
60  
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1 
2 
3 study.
7  
There also exists the possibility of exploiting long term provisions as a means 
4 
5 of managing performance. For well-performing Trusts this is particularly beneficial 
6 because a long term provision can be increased and reduce the operating and surplus 
7 
8 margins without adversely influencing the liquidity position. We therefore    incorporate 
9 
10 variations in our definition of the accruals that we investigate to capture both long 
11 term provisions and depreciation. 
12 
13 
14 The basis for our modelling of accruals is the model of Dechow and Dichev 
15 (2002) which is based on cash flows. We adapt this model as recommended by 
17 McNichols (2002),  and applied by Ballantine et al. (2007),  to accommodate     changes 
18 
19 in revenue and the level of PPE (equation 1). Using a pooled OLS regression, we 
20 estimate discretionary accruals as follows: 
22 
23 
24 
25 
WCit  1  2CFOit 1  3CFOit  4CFOit 1  5REVit  6 PPEit  it 
26 
[1] 
27 Where:  WC 
28 
is  calculated  as  the  change  in  non-cash  current  assets from 
29 time t-1 to time t, minus the change in cash and minus the change in current liabilities 
30 
31 for  entity  i;   CFO
it1
,   CFO
it      
and   CFO
it1
represent  lagged,   contemporaneous   and 
32 
33 leading cash flows from operations;   REV 
34 35 
is the change in revenue from time t-1   to 
36 
time t; PPE
it 
is property, plant and equipment at time t; 
it 
is the residual, a measure 
37 
of discretionary accruals. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets (Ballantine et 
38 
39 al. 2007). Further, to reflect the specific accounting and regulatory environment of 
40 Foundation Trusts and the potential use of long term accruals to manage reported 
42 financial  performance,  we  also  use  total  accruals  (including  depreciation  and  long 
43 
44 term provisions) to estimate discretionary accruals. The results of these estimations 
45 show that total accruals generates the highest explanatory power and we therefore 
47 adopt this definition for the purposes of our second stage   analysis. 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 7 The mean value of payables over the period of our study has risen from 11% of assets (£19m) in 2010 
54 to 14% (£30m) in 2014. Over the same period cash has risen from 13% of assets (£22m) in 2010 to 
55 17.5% in 2013, falling slightly to 15% (£29m) in 2014. This has been a particular concern of the 
56 regulator as it raises questions about allocative efficiency, overall system wide performance and the 
57 potential for public and political pressure for cash balances to be reduced in favour of improved 
58 services. 
59 
potential autocorrelation in discretionary accruals. 58 
59 
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2 
3 The  Dechow  and  Dichev  (2002)  model  for  the  estimation  of   discretionary 
4 
5 accruals has however been criticised (Wysocki 2009) as being poorly suited to the 
6 testing of earnings management on the basis that discretionary accruals made with the 
7 
8 intention  of  smoothing  earnings  will  tend  to  be  classified  as  nondiscretionary. We 
9 
10 therefore test our findings using first, the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) 
11 and second, using the approach adopted by Dechow et al. (2012)
8
. 
12 
13 
14 4.3 Model development 
15 To investigate the extent to which discretionary accruals vary in response to 
17 regulatory incentives we follow Leone & Van Horne’s (2005) model which tests for 
18 
19 variation of discretionary accruals in a not-for-profit setting. They model 
20 discretionary accruals as a function of pre-managed performance, of last year’s 
22 reported performance and last year’s discretionary  accruals. 
23 
24 
25 To test our hypotheses we adapt this model by introducing an indicator 
26 variable which represents the pre-managed risk rating. We also include control 
27 
28 variables for trust type, location and size, and year dummies to accommodate yearly 
29 
30 variations for example in funding and in demand. We estimate the following 
31 regression: 
32 
33 j3 
34 DAit  0 1Pre-mSurpit  2Ratingit 3RepSurpit1 4DAit1 5Region6Type7TIit1 7 jYEARj it 
35 j1 
36 
2
37 
Where: DA is discretionary accruals from the estimation model, equation [1]; 
38 
39 Pre-mSurp represents the pre-managed surplus scaled by lagged total assets; Rating is 
40 
41 the pre-managed risk rating taking the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 (where 4 captures a risk 
42 rating of both 4 and 5); RepSurp is reported surplus scaled by lagged total assets. 
44 
45 This model allows for performance  matching through the  continuous    variable 
46 
47 RepSurpit-1  (Kothari et  al.  2005)  and  for  the  reversing  out  of  discretionary accruals 48 9 
through   the   lagged   variable   DAit-1. 
49 
Region   and   Type are   control   variables 
50 representing location and  Trust  type  based  on the  regulator’s classifications of acute, 
51 
52 
53 
8 
We identify Trust-year observations vulnerable to accruals management as those which just pass the 
54 threshold for a risk rating of 3 and allow for the reversing out of accruals in the following years 1 
55 and 2. 
56 
9 
Dechow et al. (2012) use a binary variable to allow for the reversing out of accruals. In this method 
57 we use, consistent with Leone and Van Horn (2005), a continuous variable to control for the 
to  about one month’s operational expenditure. 58 
59 
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1 
2 
3 acute  specialist,  acute  teaching,  mental  health  and  ambulance;  TIit-1  is  lagged  total 
4 
5 income, a control variable for Trust size; YEAR is an indicator variable for the years 
6 2010-11 to 2012- 2013; is the error term. Control variables are included to control 
7 
8 for   the   possibility   that   local   health   economy   factors,   organisational   size   and 
9 
10 organisational complexity or business model affect the level of discretionary   accruals. 
11 
12 To  calculate the pre-managed ‘financial risk rating’ we  first compute  the   four 
13 
14 pre-managed component ratings of I&E surplus margin, EBITDA margin, ROA and 
15 liquidity metric using Monitor’s reporting template
10 
for each year of our study. Thus 
17 any minor changes in the metrics over the period, as shown in Figure 3, have been 
18 
19 incorporated into our estimates. For the I&E surplus margin, the EBITDA margin and 
20 
21 the ROA metrics, discretionary accruals are deducted from the reported EBITDA and 
22 I&E surplus figures, and from the assets/capital employed figure; for the liquidity 
23 
24 metric  discretionary accruals are  deducted from  the  reported  ‘net  liquid  resources’
11
 
25 
26 and operating expenses. This method of calculating the pre-managed liquidity 
27 component assumes that all discretionary accruals are working capital accruals. 
28 
29 However, we have used a model of total accruals, including long term provisions and 
30 
31 depreciation, for estimating discretionary accruals, and so treating all as working 
32 capital accruals may overstate the working capital component. We therefore 
33 
34 supplement our analysis by assuming, for the purposes of calculating the    pre-managed 
35 
36 liquidity component, that only half of the estimated discretionary accruals are working 
37 capital accruals. 
38 
39 
40 A pre-managed aggregate risk rating is then computed by applying the 
41 appropriate weightings (as in Figure 1) to each component rating and summing the 
42 
43 results. As the % plan metric, with a weighting of 10%, has been omitted because of 
44 
45 the unavailability of data, the sum of the four weighted component ratings is divided 
46 by 0.9 to arrive at an estimated final risk rating. Analysis of the implications of 
47 
48 omitting the plan metric first indicates that, as a consequence of the difference in the 
49 
50 weightings  applied to  each component,  misclassification  of  the  final  risk  rating can 
51 
52 
53 
10 
We are grateful to Monitor for access to these templates. 
54 11 Net liquid resources are defined as: Current Assets (excl. Inventories, Derivative Related Assets, 
55 Available/Held for Sale Assets and Charitable Funds Assets) – Current Liabilities (excl. Charitable 
56 Funds Liabilities) + any unused ‘Committed Working Capital Facilities’ (see Figure 3).Foundation 
57 Trusts are required by the regulator to have working capital facilities in place with banks amounting 
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1 
2 
3 only occur in a limited number of component rating combinations and second, that the 
4 
5 inclusion of the omitted plan rating would, in these instances, strengthen the findings 
6 in favour of our hypotheses.
12
 
7 
8 
 
 
9 
10 Insert Figure 3 about here 
11 
12 
13 
14 We further investigate the influence on financial reporting quality of a pre- 
15 
16 managed breach of the prudential borrowing limit and, in order to gain some insight 
17 
18 into the management of individual component metrics of the risk rating, a pre- 
19 managed component rating of 2 (signalling the potential for intervention) for each of 
20 
21 the EBITDA%, surplus %, ROA% and liquidity  metrics. 
22 
23 j3 
24 DAit  0 1Pre-mSurpit  2Compit 3RepSurpit1 4DAit1 5Region6Type7TIit1 7 jYEARj it 
25 j1 
26 
27 Where: Comp is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 when the pre- 
28 
29 managed  prudential borrowing limit is  breached or when an individual  component   of 
30 
31 the risk rating (EBITDA%, surplus %, ROA% and liquidity) is 2. To compute the pre- 
32 managed prudential borrowing metric we deduct discretionary accruals from the 
33 
34 reported ‘revenue available for debt service’ (see Figure  2). 
35 
36 
However,  whilst  we  predict  accruals  management  in  response  to a potential 
38 breach of the prudential borrowing limit (Hypothesis 2a) it is not possible to make the 
39 
40 same prediction about individual component metrics. As illustrated in Figure 1 a 
41 rating of 2 on one metric may be offset by performance on one or more other metrics, 
43 resulting in  a  3  (or  greater) rating overall.  Nonetheless  this  part  of  our analysis will 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
12 
As an illustration: A trust can only be misclassified as a 2 rating (when inclusion of the plan rating 
49 would have resulted in a 3 rating) if the sum of the I/E rating and the ROA rating is 7, the sum of the 
50 EBITDA and liquidity rating is 5, and the omitted plan rating is 4 or 5. 
51 Similarly a trust can only be misclassified as a 3 rating (when inclusion of the plan rating would have 
52 resulted in a 2 rating) if the plan rating is 2 and all the other metric ratings are 3. 
53 Misclassifications bias our findings in favour of our hypotheses because, as in the example, above, 
54 misclassification of a Trust as having a pre-managed risk rating of 3, where we predict no earnings 
55 management, would result in an overestimation of discretionary accruals associated with this rating. 
56 Similarly, misclassification of a Trust as having a pre-managed risk rating of 2, where we do predict 
57 earnings management, would serve to underestimate the level of discretionary accruals associated 
58 with this rating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
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1 
2 
3 provide  some  insights  into the  underlying dynamics  of accruals management in   this 
4 
5 setting. 
6 
7 The coefficient on Pre-mSurp in equations 2 and 3 tests Hypothesis 1 and 
8 
9 we  expect  this  coefficient  to  take  a  negative  value  to  indicate  income   increasing 
10 
11 (decreasing) discretionary accruals for pre-managed deficits (surpluses). The 
12 coefficient on Rating in equation 2 and on Comp in equation 3 (when Comp is 
13 
14 represented by the pre-managed prudential borrowing limit) tests hypothesis 2a.       We 
15 
16 expect this coefficient to be positive when the pre-managed risk rating is 2 and when 
17 the pre-managed prudential borrowing limit is breached, indicating additional accruals 
18 
19 management to avoid regulatory intervention. Finally, the coefficient on Comp in 
20 
21 equation  3  also  tests  Hypothesis  2c.  We  expect  to  be  positive  for  a  small pre- 
22 
23 managed deficit indicating additional accruals management in order to avoid reporting 
24 a small loss. We predict no additional accruals management when the pre-managed 
25 
26 risk rating is 1, 3, 4 or 5. 
27 
28 
Our predictions for the expected signs on each of the independent variables   are 
29 
30 summarised in Figure 4. 
31 
32 
33 Insert Figure 4 about here 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 5 Findings 
42 
43 5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate  analysis 
44 
45 Descriptive statistics for our sample which set the context for our 
46 investigations are shown in Table 1. 
48 
49 
50 Insert Table 1 about here 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Table 1 shows that the mean total income of our sample is £267m and mean 
56 total assets £202m. Mean EBITDA and I&E surplus as a % of income amount to 
57 
58 6.1%   and   1.6%   respectively.   Median   values   are   similar   at   6.0%   and    1.4% 
 51 
56 
 
1 
2 
3 respectively.  Thus both mean and median values are  above  the  thresholds  (I&E    1% 
4 
5 and EBITDA 5%) for a component risk rating of 3. The I&E surplus margin in 
6 comparison with the EBITDA margin is more dispersed, less negatively skewed (-0.5 
7 
8 vs -1.0) and more leptokurtic (kurtosis = 19.7 vs 8.6). The closer proximity of the 
9 
10 mean I&E performance (1.6%) to the threshold (1%) and its higher dispersion (3.5%) 
11 suggest that the I&E margin may be more of a binding constraint than the EBITDA 
12 
13 margin  which  at a  mean  value  of  6.1% and  lower  dispersion  (2.9%) suggests more 
14 
15 flexibility in achievement. In the full sample of 518 observations, a count of those 
16 achieving the EBITDA and I&E margins associated with a component rating of 3, 
17 
18 reveals  that  343  observations  achieve  the  I&E  surplus  target  of  1%  whereas   405 
19 
20 achieve the comparable EBITDA target of 5%. With regard to liquidity the mean 
21 value of 29 days is well above the threshold (15 days) for a component risk rating of 3 
22 
23 but has large  variability (standard deviation = 26 days).  The  mean value of  the   ROA 
24 
25 of 3.4% is close to the threshold for a 3 rating (3%) reflecting the similarity of the 
26 ROA measure of surplus with that used for the I&E surplus margin. The high standard 
27 
28 deviation (6.4) in ROA reflects  the  high  variability in the asset base.  The    remaining 
29 
30 rows of Table 1 set the context in which we investigate the potential for accruals 
31 management. In comparison with the mean I&E surplus of £4.3m, the mean value of 
32 
33 net current assets  (including  cash)  is  £11.2m.  The  mean  value  of payables  is £25m 
34 
35 representing almost 10% of total income. The mean value of depreciation, which does 
36 not affect the EBITDA margin but does have the potential for contributing to the 
37 
38 management of  the I&E surplus  and the  ROA metrics,  is  £7.4m.  The mean bad  debt 
39 
40 expense is low at £0.3m but again with wide variability (min £-4.4m, max £9.6m). 
41 Long term provisions amount to £1.8m (mean). Other figures in Table 1 illustrate that 
42 
43 elsewhere there may limited scope for managing discretionary accruals: inventory is 
44 
45 low with a mean value of £3m as are receivables which, with a mean value of £11.4m, 
46 represent just 16 days of revenue, and which are represented largely (over 80%) by 
47 
48 NHS balances
13
. 
49 
50 
We  proceed to report  in Table  2  the  pairwise correlations for  the  component 
52 risk  ratings  and  the  prudential  borrowing  limit  indicator.  The  components  of    the 
53 
54 financial risk rating are likely to be highly correlated as an improvement (worsening) 
55 in one metric such as EBITDA will be accompanied by an improvement in all the 
57 
58 13 Non NHS receivables (not tabulated) have a mean value of about £1m. 
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1 
2 
3 other risk rating components. As expected Table 2 shows the expected high levels of 
4 
5 correlation for each variable, with the possible exception of the liquidity rating. As a 
6 consequence, in our multivariate analysis, we first apply equation 3 to each 
7 
8 component metric before including all four metrics in the one   regression 
9 
10 
11 Insert Table 2 about here 
12 
13 
 
14 
15 
16 As  a  first  stage  of  our investigation  of  accruals  management  in response to 
17 
18 regulatory incentives, Table 3 presents discretionary accruals analysed by the pre- 
19 managed risk rating. This shows that discretionary accruals for a pre-managed risk 
20 
21 rating  of  2  are  performance  increasing to  the  extent  of  1.1% of  lagged  total assets 
22 
23 (p=0.000) or about £2.2m for a Trust with mean assets. For a Trust with a risk rating 
24 of 4 or 5 discretionary accruals are income decreasing to the extent of 1.6% of lagged 
25 
26 total assets (p=0.002) or about £3.2m for a Trust with mean assets. The discretionary 
27 
28 accruals for observations where the pre-managed risk rating is very poor (1) or just 
29 above the threshold for intervention (3) are not significantly different from zero. 
30 
31 These findings provide prima facie evidence that the null hypothesis of no variation in 
32 
33 discretionary accruals with underlying performance can be   rejected. 
34 
35 
36 Insert Table 3 about here 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 5.2 Multivariate analysis 
42 Table 4 shows the results of equation 2. Columns 1-4 show the results for 
43 
44 each pre-managed rating of 1, 2, 3 and 4 or more (respectively) and Column 5 shows 
45 
46 the results for a regression which includes all ratings, using a rating of 3 as the 
47 baseline group. The coefficient on the pre-managed surplus (Pre-mSurp) is negative 
48 
49 and significant in all cases at 1%. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis of no 
50 
51 variation in discretionary accruals with underlying performance. Consistent with 
52 hypothesis 1 the coefficient (in the order of -0.1) across all columns indicates that 
53 
54 discretionary accruals are used to manage surpluses downwards and deficits upwards 
55 
56 - the bigger the pre-managed surplus (deficit), the bigger the income decreasing 
57 (increasing) accruals. The results further show that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3 discretionary  accruals  additionally  vary  with  the  pre-managed  financial  risk rating. 
4 
5 Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, when the pre-managed rating is 2 (Column 2), 
6 discretionary accruals are found to be more positive (coefficient 0.011, p<0.01) and 
7 
8 therefore performance enhancing. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, there is no    evidence 
9 
10 of additional accruals management for a pre-managed rating of 1 or 3. However, for a 
11 pre-managed risk rating of 4 or 5 above, and contrary to Hypothesis 2b, discretionary 
12 
13 accruals are found  to  be more  negative  (coefficient  =-0.018,  p<0.01)  indicating that 
14 
15 performance is reduced over and above the levels predicted by the Leone and Van 
16 Horn (2005) model. This finding is consistent with strong incentives to protect future 
17 
18 performance  and  raises  questions  as  to  whether  the  linear  model  of   discretionary 
19 
20 accruals which underpins the Leone and Van Horn model adequately captures 
21 accruals management at high levels of pre-managed performance. The incentives 
22 
23 related  to  the  protection  of  future  performance  and  the  avoidance  of  political  and 
24 
25 public scrutiny are not specific to the Foundation Trust setting and therefore the 
26 behaviour of discretionary accruals at high levels of pre-managed performance 
27 
28 warrants further investigation in alternative  settings 
29 
30 
Column 5 shows that when the pre-managed risk ratings are taken together, 
32 the results are similar. Amongst the control variables, there is some variation with the 
33 
34 type of Trust. Discretionary accruals are lower in ambulance trusts and higher in 
35 mental health and specialist trusts as compared with the reference group of acute 
37 Trusts.  Location  however  has  no  impact,  and  size,  although  statistically significant 
38 
39 (p<0.05), has no economic significance (coefficient  =0.00). 
40 
41 Taken together our findings are consistent with the management of accruals to 
42 
43 avoid  regulatory  intervention  not  only  in  the  short  term  (discretionary  accruals are 
44 
45 additionally income increasing when there is a small pre-managed deficit) but also in 
46 the medium term (discretionary accruals are additionally income decreasing when 
47 
48 there is a pre-managed surplus and are more so when the pre-managed surplus is well 
49 
50 above intervention triggering  thresholds). 
51 
52 
53 Insert Table 4 about here 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3 Table 5 shows the results for equation 3 which tests for accruals management 
4 
5 when the pre-managed prudential borrowing limit is breached and when each 
6 component risk rating is 2, potentially signalling intervention. Discretionary accruals 
7 
8 are  more  positive  for  a  breach  of  the  prudential  borrowing  limit  (1.6%  of  assets, 
9 
10 p<0.01) and when the pre-managed I&E surplus component rating is 2 (1.3% of 
11 assets, p<0.01). This suggests that the management of accruals to avoid regulatory 
12 
13 intervention  is being  driven  by  what  could  arguably be  described  as  two ‘strategic’ 
14 
15 metrics, the I&E surplus, which is the headline performance metric for a large range 
16 of stakeholders, and the prudential borrowing limit, which has implications for the 
17 
18 strategic capacity of the Trust. The I&E surplus metric also appears to be a tighter 
19 
20 constraint (as indicated by the descriptive statistics in Table 1) than for example the 
21 EBITDA metric and may therefore be more vulnerable to a poor rating. A low rating 
22 
23 on other metrics may be representative of much poorer overall performance and the 
24 
25 risk rating may therefore be less amenable to  management. 
26 
27 Overall,  the  levels  of  additional discretionary accruals at 1-2% of  assets  (£2- 
28 
29 4m for a Trust with mean assets of £201m) is consistent with audit materiality levels 
30 which are conventionally set at 1-2% of revenue, in accordance with International 
32 Auditing Standard (IAS) 320 (para. A7).
14  
Within the context of the margins which 
33 
34 feature in Monitor’s regulatory regime however these materiality thresholds allow 
35 sufficient flexibility for the management of discretionary accruals to influence the 
37 final risk rating for the Trust. 
38 
39 
40 As a further test of the management of accruals to avoid intervention we test 
41 whether discretionary accruals are managed upwards when pre-managed performance 
42 
43 against each component of  EBITDA%,  I&E  surplus %,  ROA% and Liquidity   (days) 
44 
45 falls within a small range just below the threshold for a component rating of 3. 
46 Significant findings of accruals management in these performance bands would 
47 
48 support   the   argument   that   discretionary  accruals   were   being  managed  to  avoid 
49 
50 intervention. The ranges we choose are 1% below the EBITDA threshold of 5%, 0.5% 
51 below the I&E threshold of 1%, 0.5% below the ROA threshold of 3% and 2.5 days 
52 
53 below the liquidity threshold of 15. We also incorporate into this analysis a test of 
54 
55 Hypothesis  2c  that  small  loss avoidance  persists within  the  risk  rating regime.  The 
56 
57 14 Available at: http://www.ifac.org/system/files/downloads/a018-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-320.pdf 
58 (accessed 10 November 2016) 
59 
59 
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1 
2 
3 results are shown in Table 6. They are consistent with those in Table 4 in that accruals 
4 
5 are higher for the I&E surplus, but not for the other metrics. The table additionally 
6 provides evidence that discretionary accruals are higher when pre-managed 
7 
8 performance  falls  just  below  financial  breakeven.  A  coefficient  of  0.011   (p<0.01) 
9 
10 indicates that for a pre-managed deficit of up to 0.5% revenue (£1.2m for a Trust with 
11 mean revenue), discretionary accruals are higher by c. £2m (for a Trust with mean 
12 
13 assets) thereby providing evidence that,  consistent  with Hypothesis 2c,     discretionary 
14 
15 accruals are used to convert small underlying deficits into small reported   surpluses. 
16 
17 
18 Insert Table 6 about here 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 We supplement the investigation of loss avoidance by conducting a three way 
24 analysis of the I&E surplus margin before and after discretionary accruals. Using the 
25 
26 full sample of 518 observations for the four years from 2009-10 to 2012-13, Table 7 
27 
28 shows that of the 105 Trust observations with a pre-managed deficit, 71 (40+31) 
29 reported a surplus, and 31 reported a surplus of more than 1%, the threshold for a 
30 
31 component  risk  rating of  3.  Given  the  460  (343+117)  observations  with a reported 
32 
33 surplus this represents a false positive rate of 15%. Further, of the 343 observations 
34 with a reported surplus above 1%, 74 (43+31) had an underlying surplus of less than 
35 
36 1%, representing a false positive rate of 21%. The null hypothesis of an independent 
37 distribution of observations is rejected (Chi-sq. (4) = 156.1, p=0.000)
15 
providing 
39 prima facie evidence of the use of discretionary accruals to report an I&E surplus to 
40 
41 achieve  regulatory thresholds. 
42 
43 
44 Insert Table 7 about here 
45 
46 
 
47 
48 
49 We  also  test  whether  discretionary  accruals  in  the  intervals  just  above  the 
50 
51 threshold levels for a component risk rating of 3, and just below the threshold for a 
52 
53 
54 15 Although the Chi-square test is limited in its ability to provide information about the strength of the 
55 relationships, and is sensitive to the size of the population and to low frequencies of observations, 
56 the Chi-square statistic here is well above that required to generate a p=0.000 statistic (chi-sq =20), 
57 the population size is modest at 518 observations and the lowest number of observations in a cell is 
58 greater than the minimum 5 which would trigger concern. 
59 
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39 
 
 
1 
2 
3 risk  rating  of  2,  are  significantly  different  from  the    rest. Evidence  of  accruals 
4 
5 management in these performance bands would undermine the assumption of 
6 discretionary accruals management to avoid intervention. The results are shown in 
7 
8 Table   8.   We   find   no   evidence   of   additional   discretionary   accruals   in    these 
9 
10 performance bands. 
11 
12 
13 Insert Table 8 about here 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 In all the above tables the underlying reduction in reported surpluses/deficits is 
19 in the order of 10-11%. This is below the level found by Leone and Van Horn (2005) 
20 
21 in  US  not  for  profit  hospitals  (44%),  by  Ferreira  et  al.  (2012)  in  Portuguese 
22 
23 municipalities (40-80%) and by Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) in Belgian not- 
24 for-profit entities (57%). This lower level is consistent with the move away from 
25 
26 financial breakeven as the principal financial objective, with the integral features of 
27 
28 the regulatory regime which discourage gaming, and also with early findings that the 
29 higher the proportion of funding obtained from regulated public sources the lower the 
30 
31 reduction  of  pre-managed  surpluses  and  deficits  through  the  use  of    discretionary 
32 
33 accruals (Greenwood and Tao,  2016). 
34 
35 With similar coefficients and levels of significance, these findings are robust 
36 
37 to alternative models of accruals estimation (Dechow et al. 1995, Dechow et al. 
38 2012)
16
, to the adoption of an annual cross-sectional estimator of discretionary 
40 accruals
17   
and  to  our  alternative  method  for  calculating  the  pre-managed  liquidity 
41 
42 component.
18
 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
16 
In all cases the findings (both coefficients and statistical significance) are similar. 
49 17 With this alternative method of discretionary accrual estimation we find stronger significance for 
50 some variables. For example, the co-efficient on the pre-managed risk rating of 3 is negative, but is 
51 now significant and similar to that in Table 4, confirming the pattern of an increasing rate of 
52 accruals management with pre-managed financial performance. In Table 5, using the OLS 
53 regression, we found weak significance (10%) for the management of discretionary accruals 
54 upwards when the ROA and EBITDA component ratings were 2. However, when discretionary 
55 accruals are estimated using a cross-sectional model the (similar) co-efficients have a stronger 
56 significance (<1%). These findings strengthen the proposition that a component rating of 2 may 
57 trigger discretionary accruals management. 
58 18 See Section 4.3 Model development. 
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1 
2 
3 6 Discussion and conclusions 
4 
5 Risk based models are increasingly being adopted, internationally, for the 
6 regulation of public services. This paper investigates variations in discretionary 
7 
8 accruals  in  response  to  the  regulatory  incentives  associated  with  such  a  model  of 
9 
10 public service delivery, that of NHS Foundation Trusts, where the level of monitoring 
11 and intervention is determined by performance against two key financial performance 
12 
13 metrics: a financial risk rating and a prudential borrowing   limit. 
14 
15 
Overall,  consistent  with  prior  research  and  with  general  public  and not-for- 
17 profit incentives to signal competence and efficiency in the use of resources, we find 
18 
19 that discretionary accruals are managed to reduce the overall variation in reported 
20 performance: performance is managed upwards when there is a pre-managed deficit 
22 and downwards when there is a pre-managed  surplus. 
23 
24 
25 We contribute to the literature by finding that, in addition, discretionary 
26 accruals are managed to avoid intervention. They are performance increasing when 
27 
28 pre-managed  performance  is  just  below  the  intervention  threshold  and performance 
29 
30 decreasing when performance is well above threshold. The latter finding is consistent 
31 with a strong desire to reduce large surpluses and to protect future performance 
32 
33 against  the  possibility  of  future  regulatory  intervention.  Further,  the  incentive     to 
34 
35 achieve minimum levels of performance in order to avoid intervention has not 
36 displaced an aversion to the reporting of small losses. This finding is consistent with 
37 
38 prior  research  in  both  the  public  and  private  sectors,  a  general  aversion  to  losses 
39 
40 which is a feature of the overall regulatory framework, and with the desire to signal 
41 competence and efficiency, particularly to a wider stakeholder audience who may be 
42 
43 less concerned with the other metrics used by the  regulator. 
44 
45 
Taken  together,   our  findings   demonstrate   that  the   use   of   an  aggregated 
46 
47 performance  metric  with  features  which  aim  to  mitigate  gaming  does  not preclude 
48 
49 accruals management within acceptable audit materiality limits. Our findings also 
50 demonstrate that incentives to report high levels of financial performance, in the form 
51 
52 of lower monitoring, are not so strong as to affect financial reporting quality. In the 
53 
54 public and not-for-profit settings, however, the acceptability of stronger incentives for 
55 increased surplus reporting, for example in the form of remuneration incentives (as 
56 
57 investigated  in  Eldenburg  et  al,   2004),   is   questionable.   However,   as  healthcare 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3 services continue to be subject to reform,   with the proposed unwinding of ‘Obama- 
4 
5 care’ in the US and increased marketization elsewhere, further research into the 
6 conditions under which financial reporting quality is affected by incentives for 
7 
8 ‘better’ financial performance would be helpful in informing regulatory   design. 
9 
10 
Finally,  we  find  that  the  management  of discretionary  accruals  is  driven by 
11 
12 two  metrics  of  strategic  significance,  the  I&E  surplus  margin  and  the    prudential 
13 
14 borrowing limit. Discretionary accruals are higher when the I&E surplus margin falls 
15 below the intervention triggering threshold. Both the scale of the economic effect and 
17 the statistical significance of the findings are lower for other components of the risk 
18 
19 rating. These findings are consistent with the wider strategic importance of the I&E 
20 surplus which has significance and meaning to a stakeholder audience which extends 
22 far beyond the immediate concerns of the  regulator. 
23 
24 
25 Whilst accruals management around regulatory targets is unlikely to be 
26 eliminated, further investment in cost effective measures to improve financial 
27 
28 reporting quality would enhance regulatory effectiveness: intervention would be   more 
29 
30 timely when underlying performance is poor and there would be less scope for Trusts 
31 to disguise their potential for service development when underlying performance is 
32 
33 strong.   Such measures might include additional audit guidance, a review of  audit 
34 
35 materiality thresholds, and more refined regulatory monitoring of accruals. In a more 
36 marketised NHS, other measures might also include a strengthening of the incentives 
37 
38 to report good financial performance which, subject to wider political   considerations, 
39 
40 would mitigate the incentives to disguise surpluses. These considerations are 
41 particularly relevant when, as at present, there are considerable pressures on public 
42 
43 spending and the funding of the health  service. 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
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Variable No. obs. Mean Std.Devn. Min. Max. Median Skewness Kurtosis 
Total income £000 332 266,671 180,351 21,024 1,168,963 222,987 2.120 8.546 
Total assets £000 332 201,568 158,158 9,885 1,135,903 155,625 2.777 13.737 
Staff costs £000 332 166,415 99,594 10,488 650,127 146,322 1.812 7.554 
         
EBITDA £000 332 17,013 15,877 -19,749 106,505 13,364 2.286 10.409 
EBITDA/TI % 332 6.096 2.907 -9.504 17.545 5.972 -1.007 8.612 
         
I&E surplus 332 4,374 10,080 -45,772 93,574 3,300 2.918 32.039 
I&E surplus/TI % 332 1.557 3.521 -22.027 25.254 1.409 -0.542 19.733 
         
Liquidity days 332 28.907 26.276 -32.669 200.311 26.315 1.266 8.516 
         
Return on assets 332 3.394 6.421 -31.851 41.727 4.210 -0.640 11.785 
         
Net current assets £000 332 11,230 14,908 -23,913 91,183 8,018 1.278 6.060 
Receivables £000 332 11,363 10,693 1,349 68,546 8,174 2.795 12.107 
Inventory £000 332 3,104 3,572 0 19,132 2,316 1.941 7.311 
Payables £000 332 25,086 19,881 2,031 147,757 19,037 2.608 12.298 
Depreciation £000 332 7,441 6,211 429 42,535 5,674 2.475 11.304 
Long term provisions £000 332 1,811 2,326 0 20,368 1,030 3.613 23.501 
Bad debt expense 332 311 990 -4,426 9,637 107 3.660 35.346 
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1 
2 
3 Table 2 
4 
5 Pairwise correlation statistics: pre-managed component risk   ratings 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 p-values in parentheses 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Indicators EBITDA rating  I&E rating ROA rating Liquidity rating  PBL indicator 
EBITDA rating 1.00     
(1-5)      
I&E rating 0.64 1.00 
   
(1-5) (0.00)     
ROA rating 0.52 0.73 1.00 
  
(1-5) (0.00) (0.00)    
Liquidity rating 0.26 0.43 0.32 1.00 
 
(1-5) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
PBL indicator -0.37 -0.75 -0.60 -0.41 1.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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1 
2 
3 Table 3 
4 
5 Descriptive statistics of discretionary  accruals 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Weighted Rating 
(Pre-managed) 
N mean T-test 
mean=0 
sd min max median    skewness 
1 35 0.008 0.160 0.052 -0.097 0.153 0.004 0.700 
2 113 0.011 0.000 0.025 -0.055 0.124 0.010 1.404 
3 125 -0.003 0.145 0.019 -0.082 0.049 -0.002 -0.533 
4 or 5 59 -0.016 0.002 0.037 -0.140 0.126 -0.017 0.068 
Total 332 0.001 0.759 0.031 -0.140 0.153 0.000 0.530 
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1 
2 
3 Table 4 
4 
5 Estimation results for discretionary accruals and pre-managed risk   rating 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49  
 
  Dependent variable: DAit  Discretionary accruals 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Pre-mSurp Pre-managed surplus -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.100*** -0.0801*** 
  (0.0383) (0.0358) (0.0388) (0.0326) (0.0258) 
 Pre-managed risk rating 1 0.00687    0.0134 
  (0.00827)    (0.00877) 
 Pre-managed risk rating 2  0.0107***   0.0110*** 
Rating   (0.00332)   (0.00319) 
 Pre-managed risk rating 3   -0.00491   
    (0.00296)   
 Pre-managed risk rating >=4    -0.0182*** -0.0139** 
     (0.00632) (0.00599) 
Type Acute Specialist 0.0151** 0.0168** 0.0142** 0.0216*** 0.0232*** 
Base 
group: 
acute 
 (0.00625) (0.00667) (0.00625) (0.00779) (0.00764) 
Acute Teaching -0.000960 -0.00221 -0.00126 -0.00217 -0.00151 
 (0.00523) (0.00512) (0.00524) (0.00518) (0.00478) 
Ambulance -0.0772*** -0.0758*** -0.0808*** -0.0618*** -0.0625*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0212) (0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0216) 
M ental Health 0.0180*** 0.0172*** 0.0174*** 0.0188*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.00452) (0.00444) (0.00449) (0.00481) (0.00470) 
Region M idlands 0.00122 0.00216 0.00179 0.00176 0.00288 
Base 
group: 
London 
 (0.00583) (0.00582) (0.00580) (0.00598) (0.00611) 
North 0.00542 0.00565 0.00594 0.00479 0.00645 
 (0.00542) (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00549) (0.00544) 
South 0.00704 0.00863 0.00844 0.00569 0.00750 
 (0.00581) (0.00567) (0.00563) (0.00607) (0.00612) 
DA it-1 Prior year discretionary accrua -0.0376 -0.0689 -0.0529 -0.0401 -0.0366 
  (0.0914) (0.0970) (0.0975) (0.0933) (0.0857) 
RepSurp it Prior year reported performan 0.0780*** 0.0747*** 0.0755*** 0.0801*** 0.0877*** 
  (0.0267) (0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0286) 
TI  it-1 Prior year total income 3.04e-08** 2.73e-08** 3.00e-08** 2.69e-08* 2.74e-08** 
  (1.44e-08) (1.35e-08) (1.40e-08) (1.40e-08) (1.34e-08) 
 Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Constant -0.0201*** -0.0229*** -0.0177** -0.0162** -0.0239*** 
  (0.00754) (0.00764) (0.00772) (0.00779) (0.00755) 
       
 Observations 332 332 332 332 332 
 R-squared 0.212 0.231 0.214 0.237 0.259 
  Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1 
2 
3 Table 5 
4 
5 Estimation results for discretionary accruals and the prudential borrowing limit and pre- 
6 managed component risk ratings of 2 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 Dependent variable: DAit  Discretionary accruals 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Pre-mSurp Pre-managed surplus -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.0971*** 
  (0.0400) (0.0366) (0.0384) (0.0403) (0.0319) 
Rating EBITDA % 0.00627*     
  (0.00342)     
1 if Pre- 
managed 
component 
rating =2 or 
if prudential 
borrowing 
limit is 
breached 
I&Esurplus%  0.0129***    
  (0.00304)    
ROA%   0.00639*   
   (0.00343)   
Liquidity (days)    -0.00111  
    (0.00735)  
Prudential borrowing limit     0.0155*** 
     (0.00390) 
Type Acute Specialist 0.0159** 0.0184*** 0.0147** 0.0146** 0.0215*** 
Base group: 
Acute 
 (0.00647) (0.00672) (0.00658) (0.00642) (0.00733) 
Acute Teaching -0.00203 -0.00249 -0.000114 -0.00155 -0.00179 
 (0.00532) (0.00501) (0.00535) (0.00541) (0.00526) 
Ambulance -0.0763*** -0.0724*** -0.0766*** -0.0778*** -0.0697*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0208) 
Mental Health 0.0165*** 0.0198*** 0.0176*** 0.0177*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.00463) (0.00457) (0.00456) (0.00449) (0.00459) 
Region Midlands 0.00128 0.00391 0.00148 0.00108 0.00198 
Base group: 
London 
 (0.00585) (0.00560) (0.00564) (0.00589) (0.00623) 
North 0.00477 0.00700 0.00501 0.00487 0.00498 
 (0.00547) (0.00510) (0.00519) (0.00554) (0.00563) 
South 0.00732 0.00820 0.00727 0.00703 0.00716 
 (0.00584) (0.00560) (0.00556) (0.00584) (0.00620) 
DA  it-1 Prior yr discretionary accs -0.0504 -0.0632 -0.0557 -0.0508 -0.0489 
  (0.0982) (0.0981) (0.0981) (0.0982) (0.0965) 
RepSurp  it-1 Prior yr reported performance 0.0723*** 0.0750*** 0.0753*** 0.0734*** 0.0834*** 
  (0.0265) (0.0280) (0.0268) (0.0257) (0.0271) 
TI  it-1 Prior yr total income 3.29e-08** 3.30e-08** 2.57e-08* 2.96e-08** 2.84e-08** 
  (1.47e-08) (1.34e-08) (1.38e-08) (1.46e-08) (1.30e-08) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.0205** -0.0264*** -0.0193** -0.0186** -0.0302*** 
  (0.00797) (0.00754) (0.00755) (0.00780) (0.00819) 
       
Observations 332 332 332 332 332 
R-squared  0.215 0.239 0.216 0.209 0.250 
  Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1 
2 
3 Table 6 
4 
5 Discretionary accruals when component ratings are just below a risk rating of 3 and the I/E surplus is 
6 just below breakeven. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 Dependent variable: DAit Discretionary accruals 
59 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  DA DA DA DA 
      
Pre-mSurp Pre-Managed Surplus(AFP) -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.119*** 
  (0.0399) (0.0387) (0.0399) (0.0403) 
 
 
 
 
 
Comp 
Individual 
component 
metrics 
EBITDA, 1% below rating 3 0.00221    
 (0.00392)    
I&E surplus, 0.5% below rating 3  0.0111***   
  (0.00295)   
I&E surplus, 0.5% below breakeven  0.0111***   
  (0.00361)   
ROA, 0.5% below rating 3   0.00282  
   (0.00565)  
Liquidity, 2.5 days below rating 3    -0.00111 
    (0.00735) 
 
 
 
Type 
Base group: 
acute 
Acute Specialist 0.0148** 0.0163** 0.0147** 0.0146** 
 (0.00644) (0.00660) (0.00640) (0.00642) 
Acute Teaching -0.00166 -0.00216 -0.00140 -0.00155 
 (0.00540) (0.00546) (0.00541) (0.00541) 
Ambulance -0.0775*** -0.0754*** -0.0776*** -0.0778*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0204) 
Mental Health 0.0175*** 0.0189*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.00462) (0.00455) (0.00453) (0.00449) 
 
 
Region 
Base group: 
London 
Midlands 0.001000 0.00292 0.00109 0.00108 
 (0.00582) (0.00577) (0.00585) (0.00589) 
North 0.00472 0.00585 0.00475 0.00487 
 (0.00547) (0.00523) (0.00540) (0.00554) 
South 0.00697 0.00775 0.00693 0.00703 
 (0.00569) (0.00564) (0.00580) (0.00584) 
DA it-1 Prior yr discretionary accruals -0.0503 -0.0573 -0.0511 -0.0508 
  (0.0979) (0.0964) (0.0980) (0.0982) 
RepSurp it-1 Prior yr reported surplus 0.0737*** 0.0751*** 0.0741*** 0.0734*** 
  (0.0262) (0.0272) (0.0261) (0.0257) 
TI it-1 Prior yr total income 2.99e-08** 2.94e-08** 2.91e-08** 2.96e-08** 
  (1.45e-08) (1.39e-08) (1.44e-08) (1.46e-08) 
Year Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.0189** -0.0223*** -0.0186** -0.0186** 
  (0.00776) (0.00761) (0.00774) (0.00780) 
Observations  332 332 332 332 
R-squared  0.210 0.225 0.209 0.209 
  Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses  
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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1 
2 
3 Table 7 
4 
5 
6 Comparison of I&E surplus margin before and after discretionary   accruals 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 Pearson Chi2 (4) = 156.1, p =  0.000. 
18 
19 
20 Note: An I&E surplus margin of less 1% is associated with a component risk rating of 2 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
 
I&E Surplus % 
 
<0 
Reported 
0-1 
 
>=1 
 
Total 
<0 34 40 31 105 
Before discretionary accruals  0-1 16 41 43 100 
>=1 8 36 269 313 
Total 58 117 343 518 
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1 
2 
3 Table 8 
4 
5 Estimation results for discretionary accruals and pre-managed performance: additional test 
6 of inference that accruals management is in response to the incentive to avoid 
7 regulatory intervention
†
 
8 
9 
10 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 Dependent variable: DAit  Discretionary accruals 
45 
46 
47 
48 
†
Explanatory note: If the additional accruals management for a pre-managed component rating of 2 is driven by 
49 intervention avoidance then we would not expect to see significance on the coefficient (in equation 3on 
50 Comp when the pre-managed component rating is just above 3 (as there would be no threat of intervention in 
51 this case) or when the component rating is just below 2 (as additional accruals management is unlikely to take 
52 the Trust out of intervention measures). 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DA DA DA DA 
Pre-mSurp Pre-Managed Surplus -0.119*** -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.119*** 
  (0.0407) (0.0380) (0.0401) (0.0403) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comp 
Individual 
components 
of the risk 
rating 
EBITDA, 1% above rating 3 -0.00105    
 (0.00257)    
EBITDA, 1% below rating 2 -0.00234    
 (0.0358)    
Reporting surplus, 0.5% above rating 3  -0.00253   
  (0.00399)   
Reporting surplus, 0.5% below rating 2  0.0323*   
  (0.0183)   
ROA, 0.5% above rating 3   0.000156  
   (0.00625)  
ROA, 0.5% below rating 2   -0.00118  
   (0.00574)  
Liquidity, 2.5 days above rating 3    0.00846* 
    (0.00456) 
Liquidity, 2.5 days below rating 2    -0.00464 
    (0.00915) 
DA it-1 Prior yr discretionary accruals -0.0510 -0.0488 -0.0504 -0.0521 
  (0.100) (0.0995) (0.0981) (0.0980) 
RepSurp it-1 Prior yr reported surplus 0.0743*** 0.0757*** 0.0738*** 0.0724*** 
  (0.0263) (0.0269) (0.0261) (0.0255) 
TI it-1 Prior yr  total income 2.91e-08** 3.17e-08** 2.93e-08** 2.79e-08* 
  (1.44e-08) (1.50e-08) (1.44e-08) (1.44e-08) 
Controls Year, type, region Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Constant -0.0183** -0.0195** -0.0187** -0.0193** 
  (0.00783) (0.00825) (0.00761) (0.00773) 
      
 Observations 332 332 332 332 
 R-squared 0.209 0.221 0.209 0.215 
 Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 9 Figures 
7 
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Figure 1 
9 The component metrics of the financial risk rating for Foundation   Trusts 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 (Source: (Adapted from) Monitor, 2009b. p.14.) 
23 
24 
All terms and definitions are taken from the regulator’s compliance framework. 
25 
26 1 This is broadly equivalent to a return on capital measure. It is calculated as the income and expenditure surplus 
28 
(after deduction of finance costs but before the dividend on public dividend capital) divided by taxpayers’ 
equity plus debt (including Private Finance Initiative balances and finance leases). The public dividend is a 
29 
fixed charge of 3.5% on taxpayers’ equity and thus essentially resembles a cost of  capital charge rather more 
30 
than a dividend. 
31 
2 
The liquidity ratio is defined as cash plus trade debtors (including accrued income) minus (trade creditors  plus 
32 
accruals) plus unused committed or available working capital facility expressed as a number of days of 
33 
operating expenses (excluding depreciation). Note: this ratio is referred to as a ‘liquidity’ ratio by the 
34 
regulator but has features consistent with a cash conversion cycle. 
35 
36 (Note the commercialization of the terminology applied to Foundation Trusts in the reference to EBITDA even 
37 though Foundation Trusts do not generate ‘earnings’ as such). 
38 
39 The final ‘financial risk rating’ is the weighted average of the metric scores as illustrated below: 
40 
41 
Derivation of a Foundation Trust ‘financial risk rating’: An   illustration 
43 Example: Trust X has an I&E surplus margin of 0.8%, an ROA of 3.5%, an EBITDA margin of 6.2%, 
44 liquidity of 28 days of operating expenses, and achievement of plan of 83%. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Measure Metric to be scored Weight % Risk Rating 
1 2 3 4 5 
Financial 
efficiency 
I&E surplus margin % 20 <-2 -2 1 2 3 
Return on assets excluding dividend
1  
% 20 <-2 -2 3 5 6 
Underlying 
performance 
EBITDA margin % 25 <1 1 5 9 11 
Liquidity Liquidity ratio (days)
2
 25 <10 10 15 25 60 
Achievement of 
plan 
EBITDA% of plan 10 <50 50 70 85 100 
 
Metric Actual 
performance 
Component risk 
rating 
Weighting Weighted 
component 
risk rating 
I&E surplus margin 0.8% 2 20% 0.40 
Return on assets 3.5% 3 20% 0.60 
EBITDA margin 6.2% 3 25% 0.75 
Liquidity 28days 4 25% 1.00 
Achievement of plan % 83% 3 10% 0.30 
Weighted rating 3.05 
FINAL RISK RATING 3 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 Definitions: 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Prudential borrowing limit – the determining  ratios 
17 Dividend cover: (Revenue Available for Debt Service minus Annual Interest) divided by Annual PDC 
18 Dividend* 
19 
20 Interest cover: Revenue Available for Debt Service divided by Annual Interest 
21 Debt service cover: Revenue Available for Debt Service divided by Annual Debt Service 
22 Debt service to revenue: Annual Debt Service divided by Revenue 
23 
24 
25 * PDC Dividend: Public Dividend Capital (PDC) represents the Department of Health’s long term investment in each Trust 
26 that, although repayable, does not have a defined repayable schedule. It was initially provided to NHS Trusts when they 
27 were first formed to enable them to purchase the Trust’s assets from the Secretary of State. It appears in the Trust’s 
28 ‘taxpayer’s equity’ section of their Statement of Financial Position and is similar in status to share capital in a company. The 
29 PDC dividend, however, is not a charge related to the value of Public Dividend Capital (PDC) alone. It is paid at a rate of 
30 3.5% of the average net relevant assets of a trust. Net relevant assets are broadly equivalent to Taxpayers equity but after the 
31 deduction of some specific reserves such as the donated asset reserve. (NHS Trust Development Authority 2016, Annex 7, 
32 Appendix 6) 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59
Ratio Required level of 
performance 
Dividend cover >1 
Interest cover >3 
Debt service cover 2 
Debt service to revenue <2.5% 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 Notes: 
 
 
Figure 3 
Risk rating metrics -  definitions 
(sourced from the Regulator’s compliance framework documents19) 
1   EBITDA  is  defined  as:  Total  Operating  Income  –  Total  Operating  Expenses  (excl.  Finance  Costs,    Depreciation, 
33 Amortisation and Exceptional Items). 
34 
2 Adjusted I&E Surplus/(Deficit) is defined as: Net I&E Surplus/(Deficit) after Tax add back Exceptional Income/Costs & 
35 Impairments. 
36 
3 Total Assets Employed is defined as: Period Average of (Net Assets + Borrowings). 
37 
4 Net Liquid Resources is defined as: Current Assets (excl. Inventories, Derivative Related Assets, Available/Held for Sale 
Assets and Charitable Funds Assets) – Current Liabilities (excl. Charitable Funds Liabilities) + any unused Committed10 
38 Working Capital Facilities. 
39 
5 EBIT is defined as: EBITDA, as noted above, less Depreciation & Amortisation. 
40 
6 
Capital Employed is defined as: Period Average of (Total Assets – Current Liabilities). 
41 
7 Earnings after Financing is defined as: EBITDA – Tax – Net Finance Expense (incl. PDC dividend, PFI11 financing and 
42 other financial lease costs). 8 Capital Employed is defined as: Period Average of (Taxpayers’ Equity + Lease Liabilities + Borrowing). 
43 
9 PDC: Public Dividend Capital represents the Department of Health’s long term investment in each Trust that, although 
44 repayable, does not have a defined repayable schedule. It was initially provided to NHS Trusts when they were first 
45 formed to enable them to purchase the Trust’s assets from the Secretary of State. It appears in the Trust’s ‘taxpayer’s 
46 equity’ section of their Statement of Financial Position and is similar in status to share capital in a company. The PDC 
47 dividend however is not a charge related to the value of Public Dividend Capital (PDC) alone. It is paid at a rate of 3.5% of the average net relevant assets of a trust. Net relevant assets are broadly equivalent to Taxpayers equity but after the 
deduction of some specific reserves such as the donated asset reserve. (NHS Trust Development Authority 2016,  Annex 
49 7, Appendix 6) 
50 10 Committed working capital: Foundation Trusts are required by the regulator to have working capital facilities in place with 
51 banks of about one month’s operational expenditure. 
52 11 PFI – Private finance initiative: a method of providing funds for major capital investments where private firms provide the 
53 capital investment for public projects, such as new hospital facilities, and then lease the project assets back to the relevant 
54 public body – in this case an NHS Foundation Trust. 
55 12 Taxpayers’ Equity: Public dividend capital plus reserves (e.g. the income and expenditure reserve) 
56 
57 
58 19 Monitor, 2009b, p. 14, 2011 p. 23, 2013, p. 23. 
Financial 
Criteria 
Compliance 
Framework 
Definition 
Actual Calculation for years: 
2009/10 and 
2010/11 
2011/12 2012/13 and 
2013/14 
Financial 
efficiency 
Return on Assets 
excluding 
dividend (%) or 
Net Return after 
Financing (%) 
(Adjusted I&E 
Surplus/(Deficit)
2
 
+ PDC Dividend
9 
Expense) divided 
by Total Assets 
Employed
3
 
EBIT5  divided by 
Capital 
Employed
6
 
Earnings after 
Financing
7 
divided by Capital 
Employed8 
I&E Surplus 
Margin net of 
Dividend (%) 
Adjusted I&E 
Surplus/(Deficit) 
divided by 
Operating 
Income/Revenue 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
Underlying 
performance 
EBITDA margin 
(%) 
EBITDA divided 
by Operating 
Income/Revenue 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
Achievement of 
plan 
EBITDA 
achieved (% of 
plan) 
Actual EBITDA1 
margin divided by 
planned EBITDA 
margin 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
Liquidity ‘Liquidity ratio’ 
[expressed as a 
cash conversion 
cycle] (days) 
Net Liquid 
Resources4 
divided by 
Operating 
Expenses *365 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
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1 
2 
3 Figure 4 
4 
5 
Predicted signs of coefficients on independent  variables 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 Dependent variable = discretionary accruals. 
29 
30 
The derivation of a Trust’s financial risk rating can be found in Figure 1. 
31 
32 
33 A risk rating of 2 triggers regulatory intervention in the form of additional reporting requirements but can 
34 escalate for a risk rating of 1 to more direct intervention and ultimately to removal of the Board and 
35 Governing Body. 
36 A risk rating of 3 is the default level of regulatory monitoring which involves the submission of quarterly 
37 financial returns. 
38 A risk rating of 4 or 5 generates rewards in the form of a lower frequency of reporting (bi-annually) 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59
Independent 
variable 
Description Hypothesis  Expected 
sign 
Pre-mSurp Pre-managed 
surplus 
H1 Discretionary accruals will be 
managed to report small surpluses 
-ve 
Rating Pre-managed 
‘financial  risk 
rating’ 
1 H2b No additional accruals management  
2 H2a Discretionary     accruals     will     be 
additionally   income   increasing   in 
order to avoid regulatory intervention 
+ve 
3 H2b No additional accruals management  
4 or 
5 
H2b No additional accruals management  
Comp =1  for  breach  of  the 
pre-managed 
prudential borrowing 
limit 
H2a Discretionary     accruals     will     be 
additionally   income   increasing   in 
order to avoid regulatory intervention 
+ve 
=1   for   small   pre- 
managed deficit 
H2c Discretionary accruals will be 
additionally income increasing 
+ve 
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